(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

SUBJECT: Draft Paper: "The Roles of the DCI..." (PRM-11, Task 2)

The following observations and comments are provided on those subjects within the Draft Paper applicable to our organization.

a. A primary concern is the overall classification of the paper. The "fact of" SIGINT reconnaissance satellite activities is classified at a minimum SECRET TALENT-KEYHOLE. This paper contains multiple entries dealing with SIGINT satellite activities such as on page 43, yet the document is not controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment.

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b. The assertion that the Community maintains a degree of insularity (page 34), and that there is a lack of mutual understanding on both sides of the consumer-producer interface may be somewhat overstated. In the specific case of the NRO, direct support is provided to "Project Step Out", an effort run by DIA. Product users—analysts from MIA, DIA, and FTD—are hosted at collection sites with the specific objective of improving the interface with producers and ultimately product users.

Through my experience with the DOD's Defense Intelligence Board, I feel that there has been a significant effort to improve the consumer-producer relationship. We are NRO review(s) completed.

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also working closely with the Services on the subject of the application of national system derived data for tactical purposes, and significant progress is being made in this arena.

c. On the subject of programming and budgeting (pages 52-60), in retrospect the EXCOM type review mechanism served the NRO extremely well and did allow the DCI and the DOD to choose among options. It is important to recognize that the NRP, as compared to other intelligence programs, is unique in several ways and does not require the same type of management oversight. The NRP consists of a very limited number of programs and efforts that are relatively easy to understand at the program option level. The intelligence value of these programs is unchallenged, and warrant a special type, dedicated, review mechanism to insure that the program remains viable today and that potential future options are pursued energetically.

I hope that the above comments and observations are useful in evaluating this draft paper.

> Charles W. Cook Acting Director

